Question One. Whether the Same Body, Existing Naturally and Existing Sacramentally, Necessarily has in it the Same Parts and Properties

203. Proceeding thus to the first question, there is argument that it does not.

First, nothing can be where it was not before unless something is converted into it; but in the Eucharist nothing is converted into the properties of Christ’s body; therefore they are not there. Proof of the major: if something begins to be where it was not before, this is by some change; but there is no change in what begins to be there, because the body of Christ and all its properties remain where they uniformly were before in heaven; therefore change is in something else to which or in whose ‘where’ this body begins to be present - this is only by conversion. The minor is plain because substance alone is converted here into substance; therefore not into properties.

204. Again, second as follows: the blood is only here sacramentally after the consecration of the wine; that is, it is not under the host, first because to posit it there in another way, that is, under the species of wine, would be pointless, and second because nothing begins to be simply after it already is simply, therefore the blood does not begin to be sacramentally after it is sacramentally. But the blood is here and begins to be under the species of wine, whose consecration follows the consecration of the body. Therefore it is not here sacramentally under the species of bread. And yet the body is there. So the body does not have the same part (at least the blood) here and in heaven.

205. Third as follows: quantity cannot be together with quantity, because there is a formal repugnance between them here in respect of ‘where’, just as there is between contraries in respect of the same subject, and contraries can in no way be together because, according to the Philosopher Metaphysics 4.6.1011b15-18 [Ord. III d.4 n.2, d.15 n.2], contradictories being true together follows on contraries being true together. Therefore, the quantity of Christ’s body, which is a property of it, cannot be in it as it is under the host. This is also plain, because quantity cannot be together with a containing quantity without being located in it, because, when a foundation and a proper term are posited, the relation between them necessarily follows. The proper foundation of being circumscribed in place is a quantum, and its term is a container. But the quantity is not circumscribed here (as is plain), so it is not here at all.

206. Again, just as in the works of nature a plurality should not be posited without necessity when following natural reason, so in matters of belief too a plurality is not to be posited that does not follow by necessary deduction from what is believed. But the whole truth of the Eucharist can be saved even if one posits here nothing but the substance alone of the body of Christ.

Proof of the minor:

Because the body can be without the soul, since it is the receptive matter and is in potency to having the soul or not having it; and it has the idea of spiritual food without the soul.

Again, the body can be without the properties, because what is naturally prior can be without what is posterior.     Therefore , without contradiction, the bare substance alone of Christ’s body could come to be here without the species. But it would be a thing sufficient for the sacrament in this way, because it would be a sign of the ultimate effect, namely spiritual nutriment; therefore etc     .

207. On the contrary:

The Master says the opposite in Sent. IV d.11 ch.6 n.1. And Innocent III says the same, On the Sacred Mystery of the Altar IV ch.12, “Christ gave to his disciples the sort of body he had.” Therefore the same quality was in the body of Christ in the Eucharist as was in it in its natural existence.

I. To the Question

208. Here two things must be looked at: first what is being supposed, second what question is being asked.

A. The Supposition being Made

209. For it is supposed that Christ’s body exists in a double way, namely in heaven in a natural way and in the Eucharist in a sacramental way.

Each point is sufficiently manifest. The first from Augustine [On John’s Gospel tr.30 n.1], and it is in Gratian Decretum p.3 d.2 ch.44, “Until the end of the age, the Lord is above.” The second is manifest from what was said in question 1 earlier [nn.15-23].

210. But a doubt about the body as it is in the Eucharist concerns what the things are that it contains as parts.

211. I say that it does not contain the soul nor the accidents.

This is possible if one takes body for the thing that the soul first perfects, because there is no contradiction in this sort of body being without soul and without accidents.

212. It is also fitting, because the species represent food, and so substance and not accidents.

213. It also did in fact happen, because if the Eucharist had been consecrated during the Triduum, the true thing of the sacrament would have been there, and yet the soul would not have been there, as will be said at the end of this solution [nn.254-255, 258].

214. Also, the body does not in this way contain the blood, because this is possible and is true in fact, for blood is not animate and consequently not part of the primarily animated thing.

215. It is possible too on the part of the sacrament or in the sacrament, because in the case of different things there can be the same freely chosen sign or a different sign. The body, as taken in the stated way, differs essentially from the soul and secondarily from other things (as the blood and the like); therefore it can have a different sign. And this is proved a minori, because the body can have a natural sign that is not the same [as the sign of the blood]. For there are two essentially distinct concepts for body and blood, which concepts are the signs of conceived things, On Interpretation 2.16a19-20. And blood is essentially different from the body as the body is the thing primarily perfected by the soul. Therefore there can be a sign of it, namely of the body, that is not the same as the sign of the blood.

216. This is also proved as a fact, because it was possible for all the blood to have been separated from the body of Christ in death, and yet if the Eucharist had then been consecrated, there would have been the same thing as now. It is also possible that a large amount of the blood flowed out, and yet the whole same thing would have remained under the species of bread.

217. One must therefore hold here that the body of Christ, as it is primarily signified and contained in the species of bread, does not include the soul nor the accidents nor the blood.

B. The Question being Asked

218. As to the question asked, one must first consider the sense of the question.

219. The question here is not about the necessity of the existence of one extreme or the other, nor about the necessity of having parts or properties absolutely. But the question is about the necessity of concomitance or consequence, namely whether there are parts or properties in the body of Christ, or whether they are necessarily concomitant or consequent to it, as it exists in the way stated - on the grounds that the same things are present in the body existing in the same way.

220. And this can be understood in two ways: first whether by the ‘necessarily’ is meant necessity absolute and simply, or necessity only in a certain respect - namely that the consequent necessarily follows simply from the positing of the antecedent, or that it follows in a certain respect or by supposition, that is, on the supposition of the existence of the subject of the consequent.

221. First then one must consider necessity simply and secondly necessity in a certain respect.

1. Whether the Natural Parts and Properties of Christ’s Body are Simply Necessarily in the Eucharist as well

a. First Conclusion

222. About the first I say (and let it be the first conclusion) that there is no necessity simply that, if Christ’s body has parts or properties, it have the same ones in sacramental mode.

This is clear in brief because after the [general] resurrection there will be no Eucharist, nor either will Christ’s body have properties or features in that way, and yet it will then have them in its natural way of being.

b. Second Conclusion

223. The second conclusion is that there is no necessity simply the other way, namely that it does not follow simply necessarily that, if the body of Christ has these parts and properties in a sacramental way, it have them for this reason in natural existence.

224. This is plain first as follows: when some existence is indifferent as to two modes, then just as it can be had simply in one mode, so can it also be had simply in the other mode; but the existence simply of Christ’s body (or the thing of Christ’s body simply and really) is indifferent to these two modes, namely natural and sacramental; therefore it can be had in the latter way just as in the former, or even though not in the former.

225. Some say [Aquinas] to this, that the sense of the first premise is when neither mode depends on the other; but it is not so here, because the sacramental mode depends on the natural mode, because the natural mode is the first way the thing in the sacrament exists.

226. On the contrary, and to the main conclusion: existence in the natural mode is not of the essence of existence in the sacramental mode, nor is it the cause of it; therefore the latter does not depend on the former, because nothing depends on something which is not of its essence or cause of it, as it seems.

The first part of the antecedent is plain, because the thing of the Eucharist does not have there its natural mode of being, namely extension; but it would have it if this were of the essence of the existence or mode of being that it has there; for everything that has something has what is of the essence of it.

The proof of the second part of the antecedent is that God is the immediate cause of this existence, name of Christ’s body in the sacrament; therefore the body in its natural existence is not cause of sacramental existence.

227. Again (and it is the same as the prior argument [n.224]), the Eucharist does not depend on that which is neither the sacrament nor the thing of the sacrament, or that is not cause of one or the other; existence in the natural mode is not the sacrament (as is plain), nor is it the thing of the sacrament; rather the thing of the sacrament is existence in another, disparate mode; nor is existence in the natural mode cause of one or the other, as is plain from what has been said [n.226].

228. Again (and this is almost the same), God can cause a thing without any created thing not intrinsic to that thing; existence in the natural mode is not intrinsic to the Eucharist;     therefore etc     .

229. You will say that the major is true of absolute things but not of a relation, because a relation cannot come to be without its foundation and term; but the Eucharist includes a relation, whose term is the existence of the body.

230. On the contrary: although existence is the same in both modes, namely sacramental and natural, yet it is not the term of the relation that is included in the Eucharist in its natural mode but in a disparate mode. Proof: the thing is contained in the Eucharist in the same way that it is the primary signified thing of this sign; for this is the difference between this sacrament and others, that it really contains the first thing it signifies; but existence in the natural mode is not contained here really, but rather in another disparate mode;     therefore etc     .

c. Two Corollaries that Flow from the Second Conclusion

231. From this second conclusion follows a corollary, that before the Incarnation there could have been a Eucharist as true as there is now, and this both as to signification and as to the thing signified and contained.

232. A second corollary is that, after the Incarnation, Christ’s body could have ceased to exist in its natural mode, and yet a true Eucharist would remain both as to the truth of the sign and as to the truth of the thing signified and contained. The consequence is plain, that if from ‘the body of Christ is really contained in the Eucharist’ does not necessarily follow ‘the same body has existence in its natural mode’, then the first could be done without the second, whether it precedes or remains after the destruction of the second.

233. A proof specifically about the first as preceding the second [n.232] is this: wherever a temporal thing can have one real existence, it can simply begin to be there really after it was not. But the body of Christ can simply begin to have one real existence in the sacramental mode of existence; therefore it can simply begin to be in this mode of being, namely in the sacramental mode, after it was not here. Therefore, in order for it to begin simply to be, it is not necessary that it begin to be also in the other mode of being.

234. And if you say that when it begins here it must begin elsewhere at the same time, because, if there is a beginning simply, there is a being of the thing in itself simply; for if it begins to be in another at the same time, then, for there to be a beginning simply, it is no less necessary that it begin to be in itself, because the beginning simply of a thing is the same, just as its being simply is the same; but the being simply of this thing in itself is the being of it in its natural mode. - This response is excluded by the reasons given for the second conclusion [nn.224, 227], because if it [Christ’s body] has real existence in this way as much as in the other (from the first reason), and the latter does not depend on the other (from the second reason), then it follows that it can have a beginning simply in this sacramental mode without having a beginning in the other [natural] mode.

235. One can argue in the same way for the corollary about ‘ceasing to be’ [n.232], because wherever a temporal thing has true existence, then, as long as it remains there, it would not altogether cease to be when it ceased to be in the other mode.

d. Difficulties against the Two Corollaries and their Solution

236. Against the first corollary [n.231] I infer this unacceptable result: therefore the body could begin to be after it was, for the body began to be in the Incarnation, and yet it would have truly been before, if there had been a true Eucharist [before].

237. Against the second corollary [n.232], because then the same body would cease to be after it had ceased to be. Proof: because by ceasing to be in its natural mode it would cease to be, and yet it would remain if a true Eucharist afterwards remained.

238. I say that neither consequence is valid, because what has being simply does not, if it begins to be in another mode, begin to be save in a certain respect. Similarly, what remains in being simply would not, if it ceased to be elsewhere in another mode, cease to be save in a certain respect.

239. As to the argument about the Incarnation [n.236] I say that it would have been possible for that body to have been formed of the blood of the Virgin, and this in its natural mode of existing, notwithstanding the fact that a true Eucharist had preceded. But this formation would not have been the beginning of Christ’s body save in a certain respect, just as now the conversion of the bread into the body is not a beginning of the body save in a certain respect; and the whole reason is that what begins thus to be has being simply beforehand.

240. I speak similarly about the second argument [n.237], that the ceasing to be of the body in the natural mode would not be a ceasing to be save in a certain respect, provided however that the same body remained having the same real existence in the sacramental mode.

241. And if you object that “as it is, there was a beginning simply of Christ’s body in the Incarnation, so there would likewise have thus been a beginning simply if the Eucharist had preceded, for the being of Christ’s body in its natural mode would have been no less true then than now, and consequently, when it acquired that being, his body would, in receiving that sort of being, have had no less true a beginning” - I reply that beginning simply requires not only a beginning to true being and to being simply of that which is said to begin, but also a beginning to the first being of it. But, as it is, there was in the Incarnation a receiving not only of being but also of first being. Then, however, [sc. if the Eucharist had preceded the Incarnation] there would have been a beginning of being simply in one mode, but not the first mode, because the same being simply would have preceded under a different mode [sc. the sacramental mode], and then there would have been a beginning in a certain respect, but now a beginning simply.

242. But if you argue about ceasing to be, that ceasing to be in the natural mode is ceasing to be simply, for corruption in that sense is corruption simply and a corruption everywhere, since if it is not corrupted here then it remains after it was corrupted - I reply that no contradictories are to be admitted about the same thing when there is a distinction in their modes of being (as will be stated immediately). If therefore you are speaking of the corruption that is the separation of part from part (as of the body from the soul, or of the form of corporeity from the matter), then if there is such a corruption of something existing in such a mode, there is also a corruption of it in any mode. Otherwise the same form would inform and not inform the same thing at the same time, and consequently Christ’s body could not be made to be without a soul in the natural mode without it also being made to be without a soul in the sacrament, and vice versa. Nor too could Christ’s body be resolved into matter (the form of corporeity having been here separated from it) without being resolved there, and vice versa.

243. But if we are speaking of a corruption or separation, namely about the total ceasing to be of what is contained in this mode and in the other, Christ’s body could well cease to be here without ceasing to be there, and vice versa, because the whole ceases to have one mode of its existence while retaining the other mode, under each of which modes its total existence is truly preserved.

e. Third Corollary

244. From the above follows a corollary, namely that by the corruption that nature could bring about in the body of Christ, that is, by separation of part from part, it would be necessary for the separation of the parts of this thing to be made in the same way here and there. But through the destruction that God could bring about by his absolute power (a destruction not indeed of the being simply of the thing but of the thing in this mode), the thing would be able not to have that mode of being and yet able to have the other.

245. And if it is objected against this that what is nothing in itself is nothing in something else; therefore if Christ’s body did not have existence, that is, in the natural mode, it could not have existence in the sacrament - I say that if the major is understood by prescinding from every mode of being in something, it is false, for the body of Christ equally truly has its own real being when existing in another and when existing in itself. But if the major is understood in itself, without prescinding but by positing the proper real existence of this body, I concede it. And then I say that if the body is only in the Eucharist, it is not however not in itself, because it truly has being in that way in itself and in the Eucharist, where it exists under the sign [sc. of the Eucharist], just as it does in heaven, where it does not exist in a sign.

2. Whether the Same Parts and Properties are Present by Necessity in a Certain Respect

246. About the second member of the distinction, namely about necessity taken in a certain respect, that is, about the existence of the subject of the consequent [nn.220-221], the conclusion is this, that it is thus necessary for the same properties and parts to be in the body of Christ in this mode of being and in that.

247. Proof: because no absolute thing ceases to be in anything when a new respect comes to it precisely from outside; the properties and parts in the body are truly absolutes; but their presence in the Eucharist is only an extrinsic respect coming to them;     therefore etc     .

248. This can be argued also in accord with what was said in question two of this distinction [nn.30-41, 129-131,], that an absolute thing does not vary because of a variation in relations of ‘where’ and the like; therefore, nothing absolute in a body varies because of its ‘where’ in heaven and because of the presence of it in the Eucharist that is assimilated to a relation ‘where’.

249. Proof of the major of the first reason [n.247]:

Because there is no formal repugnance in such relation to a preexisting ‘where’, nor even is there a virtual repugnance, in the way that a contrary property is repugnant to a subject (as cold is repugnant to fire); because the opposite of this relation [sc. ‘where’] does not arise from the principles of the absolute thing, for then this relation would not be inherent in it contingently nor would it come to it from outside.

Secondly as follows: an absolute is naturally first present in what it is present in before a relation is present that is founded on that absolute, and especially a relation that is extrinsic and comes to the thing contingently. Therefore in that prior moment, before the body is understood to have a new relation in the Eucharist, either its quantity and everything else absolute is present in it, and I have the conclusion proposed, or these are not present and it follows that the contradictories are simply true,That is, the contradictories of asserting and denying of the same subject (Christ’s body) the same quantity and properties. For these properties, being absolute, would belong or not belong to Christ’s body regardless of differences in the extrinsic relation of ‘where’. ¹⁴ for affirmation and negation cannot be said to hold according to diverse features (namely according to this and that ‘where’, or to this or that presence), because just as affirmation is not of a nature to hold because of ‘where’, so neither is negation.

250. This could also be plainly argued as follows: contradictories are not simply true of the same thing in the same respect; nor should one add to ‘the same’ the addition of ‘when the predicate is absolute; a body, if it does not have the absolute here and does have it there, is here the same and at the same time and in the same respect’.

251. The two first conditions are plain [sc. ‘same thing’ and ‘in the same respect’].

252. Proof of the third [one should not add ‘when the predicate is absolute...’], because nothing else is here and there save ‘where’ and ‘where’; but neither absolute affirmation nor absolute negation hold according to ‘where’. This is plain in what is posited here, because a body can well be moved in place here and there, not insofar as these are in it according to different ‘wheres’. And so there is a fallacy of the consequent in arguing thus: ‘it is not moved here, therefore it is not moved’, although it may commonly hold due to the matter [sc. because bodies are commonly in one place; but Christ’s body can be in more than one place]. And likewise, if the same thing had two surfaces, it could well be white according to one and black according to the other; nor would there be contrariety or contradiction, because they would not hold of it according to the same sense. But as to absolute affirmation and the negation of it (provided they do not amount to the same, and provided there is no difference there save that of relations), it is manifest that they will hold according to the same sense, because the relations could not be the reason for which the affirmation and negation would hold [sc. true together], because this reason is naturally posterior to what is absolute.

II. To the Initial Arguments

253. As to the first initial argument [n.203] one must say that he who held the major that ‘nothing can be elsewhere while remaining in its place save by conversion of something else into it’ would have to gloss the proposition about what first begins to be elsewhere, and say that the properties begin to be here concomitantly but not first.

254. But against this:

First, because it at least maintains that something is here without conversion of something else into it, and consequently that conversion is not the proper formal idea, nor the precise change, for being here [n.29]. And besides, the presence of the soul and of the body here are different, because their foundation is different. Therefore, besides the presence by which the body is formally here, one must posit another by which the soul is here, and this presence is not obtained through conversion; therefore the major is false.

255. I respond, therefore, that it poses no difficulty for me, because I do not believe the said proposition to be true, as was said in the first question of this distinction [nn.42-55]. For conversion is not the reason for such presence, nor is change to such presence properly the reason, but the divine power alone, by a different change (which is not conversion), makes it the case that what is elsewhere has this presence here. And divine power can do this for the parts and properties of the body as for the whole body.

256. To the second [n.204]:

Either one holds [n.253] that the body, which is what the species of bread first signifies, does not per se contain the blood as some part of it, according to what was said above in the solution when making the supposition clear [n.214]. And then the response is easy, that the blood is only concomitantly under the species of bread, and then it is not there twice by force of the sacrament, nor yet is it in vain concomitantly under the species of bread, since it is under the species of wine by force of the sacrament, for this is to save the truth of the thing contained, which, wherever it is posited, always has the same absolute features. Nor does it follow that the blood begins to be here after it was here, when speaking of the same mode of being; for it was here concomitantly and begins to be here by force of the consecration.

But if it be held that the blood is per se part of the body as the body is the thing first signified by the species of bread, then one must say that the blood is here twice by force of the sacrament; but still not in the same way, because it is under the species of wine per se and first, for it is the first thing signified by the wine. Now it is under the species of bread per se but not first, rather as something belonging to what is first signified. Nor then is it in vain, because it is per se under the species of bread, so that the truth of the thing first contained may be preserved. Nor does it begin to be after it first was, though it did per se have being there.

257. To the third [n.205] I say that, once the extremes are posited, there is no necessity that a relation coming from outside necessary follow. For such a relation differs in this way from a relation properly speaking, or from a relation that comes from within. But the presence in question here is a relation coming from outside.

258. As to the next [n.206], although Christ’s body could be posited to be here without the other things, namely without the soul and the rest, yet once the existence of the body with these properties and parts is posited, it cannot be here without them, because of the contradiction between affirmation and negation of something absolute under two respects.

259. From this solution [n.258] is made plain what is first in the Eucharist as the thing signified and contained, and what is first concomitantly; for the former is that without which the thing first signified would not have being in a natural mode. And it could also be said that, when the existence of the body here and there has been posited, those things that are in the body under one existence are in it under the other (if one speaks of absolute forms as well). Nor yet does a contradiction follow, namely that it is a quantum and not a quantum; rather it is not a quantum here with a quantity that might be here, but with a quantity that is in heaven.

260. There is the following reason for this: In the case of things that are contingently conjoined with each other and with a same third thing, one of them can agree with that third thing without the other agreeing with it; but the presence of a substance here and the presence of its quantity are contingently conjoined both with each other and in respect of the third thing that is ‘a body being a quantum’; therefore a body can remain a quantum when one presence is posited without the other.

261. And the major seems plain, because there is no reason for their inseparability on their part among themselves, since they are contingently conjoined with each other; nor even is there this reason for inseparability on the part of the third thing, because they are contingently conjoined with that third thing.

262. Proof of the minor:

For it is plain that the presence of the substance of the body and the presence of its quantity are different, and that neither necessarily includes the other, because neither is of the per se essence of the other nor a per se cause of it; therefore they are contingently conjoined with each other.

I prove also the second part of the minor, namely that they are contingently disposed to the third thing that is the body being a quantum, because an absolute form perfects its perfectible object naturally before this sort of perfectible object or the form has a relation coming from outside. And this would be more evident if the argument were about body and soul, for the conjunction of the soul with the body is required for the existence of the composite substance. But the composite substance is naturally prior to any relation coming from outside. Therefore a substance quantum or an animated body does not have this presence or that presence (and this to something extrinsic to them), save as this presence comes to them contingently and as naturally posterior.

263. And this could be briefly argued thus: In the case of what can exist without any conjuncts whose conjunction is contingent, one of these conjuncts can precisely be without the other. The animate body or a substance quantum can be without those two presences, namely the presence of this part of the species of the Eucharist and the presence of that part; and these two presences are contingently conjoined, because neither is per se cause of the other. Therefore a substance quantum or the animate body can be with one presence and not with the other; and then nothing else would exist save that a quantity is informing what it can perfect, but it does not have the double presence the way what it can perfect has; and so what it can perfect has quantum everywhere but not with a quantity that is present everywhere.

264. On the contrary: wherever a body is a quantum, it has there what is the formal principle of being a quantum; but it does not have it there unless it is present there;     therefore etc     .

265. Again, of what sort something is here, of that sort would it be if every other being were in some way or other, possible or not, circumscribed from it; but if quantity were circumscribed under natural being, that body would not be a quantum; therefore it would not be a quantum as it is here.

266. Again, the thing of the Eucharist could be truly contained there without its anywhere having existence in the natural mode, as is plain from the first article of this question or solution [nn.222-245]. But if it were nowhere else and the only thing here first contained is the substance, then the substance would not be a quantum; and the sort it would then be in absolute form, of that sort it is now;     therefore etc     .

267. As to the argument to the contrary [n.222-230], about the contingent conjunction of the presences with each other and with a same third thing composed of absolute parts - the answer is plain from what has already been said (look for the response [nn.222-230]).a

a.a [Interpolation] To the first [n.261] one can speak by distinguishing the major: either it means what has a quantity informing it there, and thus I concede the point; or it means what has a present quantity, and thus I deny it.

     To the second [n.262] I say that quantity is always in a body, whatever sort of quantity it has; rather, although it not have a quantity as here present, yet it has it as informing it, and thus is the body a quantum.

     To the third [n.262] I say that there would be a quantity in the body of Christ, though not in natural mode or with a quantity that is present, but with a quantity that is inherent.